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Reviewing the relationship between social policy and the contemporary populist 
radical right: welfare nation state and social citizenship 
 
Abstract 
 
Whilst populism has a long-standing relationship with social policy, the recent 
emergence of radical right populism as a considerable political force across Europe 
and beyond compels us to think further about this relationship. The aim of this review 
essay is to bring together literature on populism, welfare chauvinism and social 
citizenship in order to highlight the role social policy plays in the rhetoric and 
political approach of the populist radical right. This essay reviews, how, by 
developing artificial distinctions between culturally homogeneous ‘people’ and 
corrupt ‘elite’, the populist radical right generates interpretations of social citizenship 
that confers social rights based on of cultural or ethnic belonging, rather than as a 
matter of right. By simplifying the nature of complex social policy problems, radical 
right populism further problematizes the mainstream social policy agenda. 
Consequently, radical right populism will continue to present a significant challenge 
to progressive and inclusive social policy.  
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Introduction  
 
Social policy is becoming an increasingly important focus for the populist radical 
right in Europe and beyond. The aim of this review article is to set out the conceptual 
landscape for thinking about the intricate relationship between welfare and nationalist 
far-right populism from a social citizenship perspective. The rationale for doing so 
has been driven by a new dynamic in terms of the depth and breadth of radical right 
populism in Europe and how this is contributing to increasingly narrow 
understandings of social citizenship. Indeed, the relationship between social rights 
and ethnicity has become part of the mainstream discourse in many Western 
democracies. As recent electoral results convincingly demonstrate, populist radical 
right parties have become central actors in many European Union member states: 
Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden Finland, Austria, France, Poland, Greece, and 
Hungary all host populist radical right parties exhibiting sustained electoral success 
through nationalist and anti-immigrant political strategies that hinge largely on 
narrow, nationalist conceptualisations of social citizenship. 
  These trends have been the focus of several academic studies that have 
investigated the emergence and success of the European populist radical right 
(Mudde, 2007; Hainsworth, 2008; Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015; Wodak et al. 2013; 
Berezin 2009, 2013; Bustikova, 2014; Rydgren, 2007; Carter, 2005; Kitschelt and 
McGann, 1995; Taggart, 1998; Szcerbiak and Taggart, 2008; Usherwood and Startin, 
2013; Fekete, 2018). At least in part, this success stems from the strong 
(re)emergence of nationalist and anti-immigration agendas in European politics and 
welfare nation state politics (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Mews and Mau, 
2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2013; Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015; Norocel, 2016; ). In 
this review we suggest that it is critically important to better understand the welfare 
policies and welfare rhetoric linked with the populist radical right approach to social 
citizenship, not least because of the role social citizenship plays in the mainstreaming 
and normalisation of radical right political agendas in contemporary European 
societies.  
It is the absence of an ideological core that enables the populists in general but 
also radical right in particular to attach itself to the dominant, hegemonic ideological 
approaches (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). The approach can be at the same 
time ‘chameleonic’ (Aslanidis, 2016) or antagonistic in nature (Laclau, 1977). Mudde 
sees populism as ‘a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘‘the pure people’’ versus 
‘‘the corrupt elite’’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543). Mudde and 
Kaltwasser drill further into the thin centredness of populism by describing it as an 
ideology that demonstrates “an identifiable but restricted morphology that relies on a 
small number of core concepts whose meaning is context dependent’ (2013a: 150-
151) and which leaves space for adjustment and adaptation on the bases of changing 
perceptions, practices and needs of different societies (Freeden 1998: 751). Freeden 
goes even further, suggesting that the populist radical right ‘is simply ideologically 
too scrawny even to be thin … It is emaciated rather than thin-centred’ (2018: 3). The 
distinction between ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ is important as it highlights the strong 
tendency for populism to be more about ‘form’ of the argument rather than ‘content’ 
(Laclau, 2005a). However, in the case of the radical right, this quickly morphs into a 
question of how exclusively one ought to define ‘people’ and radical right populism 
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could fall into what some would call both an exclusive concept and an excluding 
process (Berezin 2009; Betz 2001; Rydgren 2005) with significant potential 
consequences for social citizenship and social rights.  
As we have argued elsewhere, radical right populism tends to link welfare and 
social policy with the relevant nationalist project (Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015). In 
this review we explore the links between citizenship and radical right populism, 
highlighting the flexibility of the populist approach in incorporating multiple 
understandings of social citizenship within its remit. The populist radical right has for 
a long time argued that welfare and social policy has been designed, delivered – even 
purposely sabotaged – by corrupt elites that ignore the interests of the people, which 
in this case means the native common men and women (Andersen and Bjørklund, 
1990; Van Der Waal, De Koster and Van Oorschot, 2013; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 
2012). The populist radical right argument concentrates on two basic but fundamental 
critiques of welfare and social policy. First of all the wrong people administrate 
welfare and social policy, so its design and delivery are not in the interest of the 
native ‘common man’. Secondly, the focus of the critique hones in on questions of 
access to welfare, which in turn implies that the corrupt elites have given access to 
undeserving migrants in support of multiculturalism. This is seen not only to 
undermine the nation state but also to diminishes the quality of welfare and social 
policy (Ketola and Nordensvard, 2018).  
Following this introduction, the second section of the article is focused on 
discussion of social citizenship and how the different conceptions of citizenship relate 
to the populist radical right. The third section will discuss how radical right populism 
as a thin ideology can team up with either a nationalist neo-liberal social citizenship 
or with a more nostalgic nativist social democratic social citizenship – or indeed a 
combination of both. The fourth section discusses the changing and chameleonic 
nature of radical right populism in general and welfare chauvinism in particular. We 
conclude the paper with the importance of national context of understanding how 
radical right populism links up with particular understanding of social policy. 
 
Social Citizenship and Social Policy 
 
Any discussion involving welfare and social policy tends to be rooted in a certain 
understanding of positive social rights associated with particular welfare services. 
Welfare begins with our membership in a political community which confers us 
particular rights and duties. Indeed the radical right populists’ focus on re-defining the 
‘people’ in increasingly narrow terms tends to be motivated precisely by this 
relationship between membership in a political community and the welfare rights that 
setm from this. The questions focus on both the content of social citizenship and 
whether welfare offers policies based on ‘equity’, ‘equality’ or ‘need’ (Enser-
Jedenastik, 2018) located on the continuum between extensive redistributive policies 
and a far more limited liberal laissez-faire market approach and access to social 
citizenship, problematising who counts as a citizens and to what extent should non-
citizens have access to social services. However, before moving further in our 
discussion it might be useful to determine with what we mean with citizenship in this 
context. The meaning of citizenship is rather ambivalent and constantly adapting to 
new normative and ideological contexts. This fluidity is well illustrated by Smith’s 
outline of different understandings of citizenship evolving through time (2002). 
• First, a minimal understanding of citizenship refers to a set of political rights 
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granted to citizens in order to participate in the political processes of self-
governance. Harking back to ancient Greece, this understanding confers 
citizenship to an exclusive group of members in a political community (polis). 
In this model, public policy is executed through a partnership between the 
‘elite’ who have been granted citizenship rights (as well as duties), and the 
polis. Here citizenship is less about social rights as the main focus is 
determining the right of self-governance.  
• The second conception of citizenship is both more inclusive in membership, 
going beyond a male elite, and more limited in being more concerned with 
liberal citizenship focused on legal status as the key determinant of ‘full 
membership in society’ (Holston and Appadurai, 1996: 187). Or as belonging 
in a political community that comes with rights (political, civil, social) and 
duties (taxes, laws) (Smith, 2002: 105; see also Marshall, 1950). Citizenship 
becomes associated with certain legal implications of belonging to a particular 
community and social policy the means to meet the citizens’ particular social 
rights. 
• The third definition extends the second conception beyond the nation state. It 
substantially expands the idea of citizenship to include virtually any form of 
membership that implies right or duties, to the extent that citizenship could 
refer to anyone ‘who belongs to almost any human association, whether a 
political community or some other group’ (Smith, 2001: 105). Whilst such 
usage of the concept is largely metaphorical, by decoupling citizenship and the 
nation state, it lends credence to multicultural (Kymlicka, 1996) and 
cosmopolitan (Linklater, 2007) conceptions of citizenship, moving towards a 
recognition of global citizenship rights and duties (George and Wilding, 2002).  
• The fourth approach also looks outside the state and highlight the potential 
role for civil society organisations to facilitate a model of active citizenship. 
Popularised by the work of Robert Putnam, citizenship here expands to 
include membership in bowling clubs, bird-watching associations and other 
social organisations. This represents an increased focus on the individual 
citizens with a concern to improve ‘certain standards of proper conduct’ 
(2002: 106). Premised on the assumption that ‘participation in civic 
organizations inculcates skills of cooperation' as well as a sense of shared 
responsibility for collective endeavors’ (Putnam, 1993:90). Importantly this 
active, or responsible citizenship tends to be anchored in a sense of individual 
responsibility aligned with neoliberal understandings of individual agency vis-
a-vis the state (Delanty, 1997). 
 
What Smith’s whirlwind tour of the history citizenship helpfully demonstrates 
is the malleability of citizenship as a concept adaptable to any given social and 
political context. This is particularly true of social citizenship, the content of which is 
under constant review and varies widely between countries, making it particularly 
attractive target for populist radical right rhetoric.  
 
Social Policy as a foundation of citizenship 
 
Nationalism and populism might appear as slightly odd bedfellows. As Freeden points 
out, nationalism tends to be defined with reference to external political enemies while 
populism is aligned against domestic enemies (2018). However, in relation to 
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dominant forms of modern citizenship, what Purcell describes as ‘liberal-
democratic/Westphalia’ (LDW) citizenship, or a system where ‘individual political 
actors agree to a “social contract”’ within a nation state, ‘sovereign in its territory’ 
(2003: 565). In this way, as Hjerm and Schnabel point out, ‘national identity suggests 
some kind of perceived or felt homogeneity – whatever people consider as uniting 
(e.g. a shared language, value system, institutional framework or just the idea of ‘us’ 
against ‘them’)’ (2012: 347). The nation state also represents a source of solidarity 
among people who may never meet face-to-face, creating what Anderson described as 
and ‘imagined community’ (1983). Community is based on a more abstract idea 
where the bonds of solidarity are created among people who never meet each other 
‘yet in the minds lives the image of their communion’ (1983: 6-7). As the subsequent 
paragraphs demonstrate, to a significant extent this imagined community tends to be 
concretised and made real by social policies.  
T.H Marshall’s (1950) now classic conceptualisation of citizenship rights, 
which is rooted in the second conception of citizenship outlined above, proposes that 
full citizenship rights have been achieved through a struggle where groups claim their 
rights from state or the sovereign. A sense of struggle is palpable in Marshall’s 
threefold model of citizenship rights that comprises of civil, political and social rights. 
Civil citizenship refer to those rights that are necessary for us enjoy individual 
freedom, such as freedom of speech, religion and fair treatment before the law and 
emerged in the early 18th century as necessary preconditions for successful capitalist 
economic systems (Wagner, 2004: 280). Political rights refer to the ability of 
individuals to participate in the political process, to hold office and to vote. Finally, 
social element has to do with access to a ‘modicum of economic welfare and security’ 
that is guaranteed through the provision of education, housing, healthcare and 
pensions as a matter of right (Marshall 1950: 11). This was in part an effort to 
guarantee the working classes a certain living standard independent of the market. 
Social rights realised through the welfare state, therefore, were the pinnacle of social 
citizenship and social solidarity. However, given that civil rights perceive of the 
citizen as an individual requiring protection from state interference while social rights 
promote state intervention, a degree of conflict between negative (civil) and positive 
(social) rights is inevitable (Wagner, 2004: 280). 
There are two contrasting approaches to acquiring citizenship that grants 
access to these kinds of rights. The first is a blood-based system of citizenship (jus 
sanguinis) of which Germany is a classic example. The core principle of citizenship is 
based on a genealogy of belonging to the nation. The second is a territorial-based 
system of citizenship (jus soli), exemplified by France, where citizenship is based on 
territory – one has to be born on the territory of France in order to acquire French 
citizenship (Brubaker, 1992).  
In the context of present-day nation states welfare is the most important arena 
for the performance of such solidaristic practices. Kpessa, Béland, Lecours (2011) 
and Blyth (2022) make the point that social programmes associated with the welfare 
state play an important role in the development of national identity. Welfare services 
and the solidaristic practices associated with welfare states differ between countries, 
further solidifying the links between social policy and national citizenship. This is 
best demonstrated in relation to the idea of welfare regimes, which each create their 
own forms of citizenship practices (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The liberal (United 
States, Switzerland, and Australia), corporatist (Austria, France, and Germany) and 
social democratic (Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark) approaches each 
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incorporate different emphasis on rights. In a liberal citizenship regime, the state 
relies ‘on markets to allocate social rights emphasizes civil and political rights’ (Isin 
and Turner, 3:2002). In corporatist states, the social rights are important, but they are 
not universally available. Social rights are most important in the social democratic 
countries where the state ‘provides universal benefits such as free vocational or higher 
education’ (Isin and Turner, 3:2002). 
However, at the same time there have been developments, broadly associated 
with globalisation that have begun to dilute the distinctions between the welfare 
arrangements of nation states. Scholars describe the Nordic universal and egalitarian 
system creating social services that are de-coupled from nationality or ethnic origin. 
Universal welfare services should not discriminate any citizens (Rothstein and Stolle, 
2003:196).  
 
Radical right populism and social policy 
 
The concept that is at the core of the populist radical right, populism, may benefit 
from some further discussion. For some, populism is an inherently democratic 
concept, offering a highly valuable mechanism for a range of normally silent voices to 
be heard in the political debate (Canovan, 1999; Laclau, 2005). It serves a 
counterhegemonic function and is therefore ultimately a ‘productive force that may 
serve as the catalyst for a profound realignment’ (Kriesi, 2014: 361). For others, 
populism should be reserved for a narrower group that does not include all anti-elitist 
actors. Müller, for example, identifies both anti-elitism and anti-pluralism as 
characteristics of populism, combined in a heady mix with particular claims to a 
‘moral monopoly of representation’ (2016: 2-3). Significantly, from a social policy 
perspective, Müller further argues that this tends to lead to a lesser concern with 
genuine alternative policy trajectories, which are replaced with efforts to discredit 
their mainstream political rivals as uninterested in what really matters to voters 
(2016). This, ultimately, serves as the central justification for the anti-pluralist 
argument in favor of the tyranny of the majority and demonstrates a core problem of 
populist politics in relation to social policy: the black-and-white choice between rule 
by the ‘people’ or rule by the technocratic (social) policy and political elite. 
 As has already been mentioned, populism is probably best understood as a 
‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde, 2004: 544) that is largely premised on an anti-elitist 
ideational narrative (Laclau, 2005b). Based on ambiguous generalizations that crudely 
demarcate boundaries between the ‘elite’ and the ‘people’, where the former are 
characterised as corrupt and failing to serve the best interests of the latter.  At the 
same time the ‘people’, by representing the simple majority (i.e. the general will), 
possess an innate legitimacy to challenge elite rule (Mudde, 2010). This approach can 
be summarised in four concepts. Initially, the two key groups of actors - the ‘people’ 
and the ‘elite’ are both treated as uniform categories, followed by an assumption that 
their relationship is largely hostile. Thirdly, the populism is anchored in the principle 
of popular sovereignty, followed fourthly by the valorisation of the ‘the people’ and 
denigration of ‘the elite’ (Stanley, 2008: 102). Roodjuin’s similar fourfold, 
characterisation adds a fifth concept: the proclamation of crisis (Rooduijn, 2014: 573). 
 
Implications for social policy 
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The populist radical right approach to politics contains substantial implications for 
social policy. In part, the populist radical right draws on nativism and the aspiration 
for an ethnically singular nation. Therefore, despite the importance of populism, for 
commentators such as Cas Mudde, the populist radical right refers to a party family 
where ‘nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology’ (2007: 
26). This core narrative built on recent significant structural changes around 
globalization, migration and disappointments of the post-industrial era. As such, the 
narrative aspires a return to the ‘golden past’ of the 1960s and 1970s, and conjures up 
an image of a nation whose difficulties can be explained by weakening of its core 
cultural identity through processes of globalisation and multiculturalism.  
Of particular concern here are the efforts by the populist radical right to 
reimagine the welfare state as a welfare nation state. This reimagination refers to the 
particular understanding as to who makes up the ‘people’ that the welfare state 
consists of. Thus, rather than necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the 
redistributive welfare state, it becomes reframed in narrower terms as belonging to a 
sovereign and exclusive political community confined within clearly defined borders 
(xxxx). Such policy positions, drawing on explicit welfare chauvinism, Enser-
Jedenastik (2018) argues, are more prominent in countries that support welfare 
programmes that draw either on principles of equality (universal) or need (means-
tested). Otjes et al. (2018), when comparing the economic policies of seven populist 
radical right parties across Europe, also find a ‘unified nativist’ response that draws 
distinctly on welfare chauvinist rationales. These tactics are effective. As Schumacher 
and van Kersbergen (2014) show, mainstream parties do adapt to the welfare 
chauvinist rhetoric by racheting up their critique of multiculturalism as well as taking 
on more pro-welfare positions. 
The populist radical right’s argument has therefore, two basic but fundamental 
critiques of welfare and social policy: the first problematises access to social 
citizenship in welfare chauvinist terms, drawing on arguments that draw on explicitly 
ethnic or cultural criteria and arguing that multicultural policies diminish the overall 
quality of welfare. The second accuses the bureaucratic elites of administrating 
welfare in ways that fail to serve the interest of the native ‘common man’, where the 
corrupt elites have opened social citizenship to undeserving migrants that in so doing 
undermines the welfare state (xxxx). In the next two sections we will review the two 
sides of this anti-elitist argument, the corrupt elites and the true, incorruptible 
‘people’. 
 
Welfare and corrupt elites 
 
A critical focus on the elite and mainstream political leadersip is an important aspect 
of populism. This is seen to be supporting a particular set of interests that hinders 
welfare and social policy, reflecting a critical attitude towards mainstream politics in 
general (Rydgren, 2007). In the worst case, social policy is part of cultural elites’ 
propaganda. Nordensvard and Ketola show how radical right populism  portrays 
economic globalization, mass-immigration and Europeanization as an elite project 
that supports multiculturalism at the expense of the nation state. Moreover, the anti-
elitist argument suggests that the policy and political elites use external interests 
(globalization, immigration, EU) to further their own interests and power. By 
prioritising EU policies, giving into globalisation and opening borders to immigrants, 
this elite has neglected the interests of the nation (2015). 
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As Kriesi observes, in populism ‘the people are paramount’ (2014: 362) and 
moving onto identifying three ways to conceptualise the people as: political (people 
as sovereign), cultural (people as a nation) and economic (people as a class) (2014; 
see also Mény and Surel, 2000). However, as Katsambekis and Stavkrakakis (2017) 
prudently remind us, the relationship between ‘people’ and ‘nation’ is highly context 
dependent and historically determined, making it very challenging to draw 
generalisable rules about the nature of this relationship. To a significant degree, these 
conceptualisations of the people are made meaningful by reference to welfare 
policies, for example through arguments  that legitimate a narrow policy agenda 
favoring the social rights of the ethnic (working class) majority at the expense of the 
political elites and cultural minorities. This amalgamation of nativist sentiments with 
particular rearticulation of the ‘people’ in narrower terms poses considerable 
challenges to the mainstream approaches to social policy. Conflating the definition of 
‘people’ with the representatives of a particular ethnic identity amounts to no less than 
rearticulating the rules of access to social citizenship and social justice. 
The effectiveness of the argument that combines anti-elitism and welfare 
chauvinism appears, at least to some degree, to hinge on the existing levels of 
inequality. This emerges from Enser-Jedenastik’s (2018) findings which suggest that 
programmes based on need and delivered on means-tested bases are among the most 
likely targets for welfare chauvinistic critique, as well as with the findings of Van Der 
Waal, De Koster and Van Oorschot (2013) who identify an association between high 
levels of means-tested, selective welfare services and welfare chauvinism. Mewes and 
Mau (2013) conclude that the “civilizing” impact of globalisation tends to be 
differentiated based on socio-economic status, with higher socio-economic groups 
benefitting more from this.  
Indeed, De Koster, Achterberg and Van der Waal (2013: 4) suggest that the 
social agenda of the populist radical right is specifically focused on the interests of the 
native ‘common man’. The populist radical right not only argues against welfare for 
foreigners, but also criticizes the way welfare is arranged and delivered in a manner 
that neglects the interests of the ‘common man’. This perception that the needs of 
migrants in general are given preferential consideration at the expense of ‘natives’ is a 
common feature of populist radical right rhetoric in Europe and beyond (Spinney and 
Nethery, 2013). In the view of the populist radical right, social citizenship is not 
designed with the poor common people in mind who are in genuine need of support. 
Rather, the main beneficiaries are the civil servants who are provided with well-paid 
jobs within the welfare state and whose actions support the “welfare scroungers” (De 
Koster et al. 2013: 6). 
 
Welfare and the true citizens 
 
However, such straight forward definitions of citizenship as those put forward by the 
populist radical right rarely reflect the complex reality of lived citizenship. There are 
different scales of being a citizen in practice and we need to differentiate between the 
experiences of living at a place and being a full member of society with all rights and 
duties that accompany it. Hettne (2000: 35), for example, argues that citizenship 
should be perceived of as a variable that can range from being substantial to being 
degraded to mean nothing. These qualifications are important in the context of 
welfare chauvinism and radical right populism, as they focus on both the rules of 
access to welfare as well as the nature of the welfare rights granted to citizens. The 
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broad argument here is that citizenship rights ought to be differentiated on the bases 
of belonging: since migrants and ethnic minorities belong ‘less’, we need to rethink 
both their overall access to welfare and the content of the welfare services they are 
entitled to. In this context, the relationship between the nation state and nationalism 
becomes an important variable in understanding the access versus content debates.  
 The interactions between nationalism and social policy have gained attention 
among scholars in recent years. Béland and Lecours (2005; 2008) investigate such 
linkages in multinational contexts of Canada, United Kingdom and Belgium and a 
great deal of the research to date has been focused on developed, multinational states 
(Banting 2005; McEwen 2006; Boychuk 2008; Béland and Lecours 2008). Alesina 
and Glaeser (2004) point to ‘racial heterogeneity’ in the United States as the reason 
for the absence of a redistributive welfare state. Citizens, they conclude, are more 
likely to grant wider social citizenship rights to others from their own group, which 
leads the authors to link the limited redistribution of resources through the welfare 
state to views on minorities. However, others challenge the impact of nationalism on 
social policy. Both Taylor-Gooby (2005) and Gerdes (2011) question the association 
between welfare and immigration, arguing that the links are far more nuanced and 
have to do with types of welfare programmes (Taylor-Gooby, 2005). Gerdes, in his 
study of Danish municipalities, fails to identify an association between immigration 
and public spending (2011). Nevertheless, the European populist radical right 
discourses towards the welfare state remain closely linked with nationalism and in 
this way challenge the general trends in the development of welfare policies in 
Europe. 
 At least in the European context, the dominant understanding of citizenship 
has become increasingly disconnected from the ethnic origins of the nation state. For 
example, the social democratic approach to welfare with its universal and egalitarian 
policies and principle of non-discrimination has been argued to create services that 
are decoupled from nationality or ethnic origin (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003: 196; 
Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Residency has become an important point of entry to 
social citizenship rights, underpinned by a gradual ‘denationalization of solidarity 
practices’ (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009: 241).  The impact of deeper integration of 
European nations on national sovereignty has sparked negative reactions against 
access to social rights based on residency, because it dilutes the nation’s role in social 
citizenship (Sainsbury, 2006).  
As access to social policy becomes disconnected from ethnic origins, 
questioning the legitimacy of this can be found at the core of the populist radical right 
problematization of welfare policy. In counterpoint to the expansion of denationalised 
citizenship rights, the populist radical right have begun to reframe socioeconomic 
rights as the exclusive currency of those citizens with cultural, even ethnic affinity 
with the nation state (Betz and Johnson 2004; Evans et al. 2001; Faist, 1994; xxxx). 
The populist radical right discourse therefore suggests that social citizenship needs to 
be closely associated with an ethnic and sovereign nation state. The definition of the 
‘true people’ in the populist lexicon is strongly connected with a need to re-define 
welfare access in narrower terms.  
 
Social citizenship and populist radical right populism: context and 
contradictions 
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The ‘classical’ populism of the radical right was largely modelled around a synthesis 
of neo-liberalism and nationalism, with, as suggested above, an active agenda to 
reduce the size of the welfare state. The re-engineering of the welfare state is now 
centred around processes of marketization, responsibilization and new governance 
arrangements which focus more on market actors than traditional social movements 
(Salamon, 1993; Barnett, 2003; Petersen and Hjelmar, 2014). According to this view, 
‘individual freedom could only be achieved by liberation from various forms of state 
regulation, and through the market, in the form of individual choice’ (Thörn and 
Larsson, 2012:264).  Kitschelt’s and McGann’s typology of parties of the radical right 
is one early example. They identified anti-establishment populism, authoritarian 
capitalism and welfare chauvinism as the three vote-winning strategies available for 
radical right parties, highlighting authoritarian capitalism as the ‘master case’ for the 
radical right, as it was deemed to guarantee ‘a high electoral return given that it can 
appeal to a cross-class alliance’ (1995: 19).  
However, authoritarian capitalism is not the only game in town. As Hans-
Georg Betz (1994: 107) has argued, the populist radical right in Europe is having to 
respond to the changing behaviour of modern voters who 'increasingly tend to 
privilege issue-and value-oriented forms of participation over ideology-oriented ones'. 
Here Betz distinguishes between two ideal types, national populism and neoliberal 
populism, and points out that the ideologically-driven libertarian and neoliberal 
politics have been gradually pushed aside by value-driven politics of xenophobia and 
racism. Wodak et al. (2013: xviii) further identify two phenomenon, the 
‘Berlusconisation’ and ‘Haiderization of Europe’, alluding not only to the divergent 
paths radical right populist parties in Europe have taken, but also highlighting the 
influence party leaders are deemed to have over party strategy and its performance at 
the ballot box. 
Recalling the thin, even ‘emaciated’ ideological centre (Mudd, 2010; Freeden, 
2018) and the context dependent meaning of the few core concepts (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2013), it is therefore not surprising that the welfare chauvinism of the 
populist radical right is constantly adapting to prominent themes about inequality, 
identity and culture. Indeed, one can envisage a continuum of approaches between 
neo-liberal welfare nationalism focused on the smaller, business like welfare state on 
the one hand, and restorative social democratic nationalism aiming to reconstruct 
welfare to its former glory on the other. However, the larger, more extensive welfare 
state would only be deemed possible where welfare can be restricted to its own ‘true 
people’. 
The interleaving of cultural arguments in the social citizenship debate lends an 
additional dimension to welfare chauvinism. To what extent should social citizenship 
be acquired through being part of an ethnic community, or culture or both? This 
shows one of the largest contradictions of radical right populism: the linkages 
between race and culture, as well as the attempts to delink them. That race and culture 
could possibly be intertwined is downplayed as a way to mainstream the overall 
discourse but also to distance the populist radical right from biological racism and 
being an extension of national socialism.  
This cultural turn has become a hallmark of the populist radical right in 
contemporary Europe. Yilmaz (2012), for example, argues that culture has become 
the new ‘common sense’ through which the world around us is being ordered and 
organized. For example, the whole idea of ethno-pluralism and Nouvelle Droite in 
France during the late 1960s and 1970s was very much influenced by Gramsci’s 
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notion of cultural hegemony, which was based around struggles of cultures rather than 
party politics. Rydgren (2007) also elaborates that this counterhegemony was about 
adopting core ideas of their opponents and imbue them with nationalist content. 
‘Departing from the left’s notion of difference— on which the doctrine of 
multiculturalism (that is, the idea that migrants should have the right to preserve 
habits and traditions of their home countries) is largely based— the notion of ethno-
pluralism states that, to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, 
they have to be kept separated’ (Rydgren, 2007: 244). This assumes that the mixing of 
ethnicities would lead to cultural extinction (Griffin 2000, Taguieff 1988) and that 
cultures might be different, incompatible, and incommensurable (Betz and Johnson 
2004, Taguieff 1988). Soysal (2009: 5–7) has gone on to argue that culture has 
‘become the predominant mode of addressing citizenship, security, and even 
economy, which were conventionally considered to be distinct from culture’. Cultural 
arguments return as key components of the new common sense by which social 
citizenship is being defined. We argue that radical right populism has in some 
variegated form linked itself to a cultural understanding of citizenship (people from 
similar cultures are welcomed, or those who reject their cultural origins and join a 
new culture), which distinguishes it from traditional far right groups who still profess 
the importance of race and nativism.  
This further problematizes membership in a nation, where some argue that 
becoming citizen means rejecting former identities and assimilating with mainstream 
culture, while others closer to classical far right highlight the importance of the 
biological race. These points create contradiction in both defining the nature of 
citizenship and who has access to its rights and obligations. These points create 
contradictions in both defining the nature of social citizenship and who has access to 
its rights and obligations. However, these contradictions are part and parcel of radical 
right populism as a thin-centred ideology. 
Despite the rich array of options in how to approach the questions of social 
citizenship and welfare chauvinism, the common denominator across them is the clear 
intent to reduce the complex and contingent policy issues into simple black-and-white 
choices. In this way, the populist radical right’s approach to social policy is at odds 
with the true nature of social policy problems and the policymaking processes 
required to tackle these problems. Generally speaking, social policy problems can be 
described as ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber 1973). They are complex and ambiguous, 
long-lasting, and there are various perspectives to them. There are no solutions that 
are undisputable, nor can they be solved by focusing on one perspective or approach 
at a time but rather the solutions are usually multidimensional and multidisciplinary. 
The challenges are also complex and systemic by nature (Holland 1995; Room, 
2001), which means that various dimensions of activity and diverse actors are needed 
for a sustainable change. Addressing such policy challenges in a complex and volatile 
environment requires a collaborative approach that incorporates the views and 
interests of a wide range of stakeholders (Loorbach 2007). Instead, the populist 
radical right problematizes this by presenting one set of views (the ethnically 
dominant, working class view) as the only legitimate source of solutions. 
This ‘wicked’ nature of social policy problems has meant that the populist 
radical right’s approach has been particularly successful when employing the critical 
language of welfare. Indeed, crises play an important role in the populist radical 
right’s engagement with social policy.  As Moffitt (2015) compellingly argues, crises 
are central to populist politics, not as an objective category of events that elevate 
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populist politics to the public consciousness, but rather in the sense that ‘populist 
actors actively perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis’ (2015: 195). In short, populist 
parties ‘spectacularize failure’ and through their public ‘performance’ are able to 
propel a sense of crisis (2015: 198). Although they may not always be the most 
prominent problems on the radar of the populist radical right, social policy problems 
are particularly helpful in this regard. Indeed, a crisis narrative has been frequently 
associated with welfare developments ever since the 1970s and which has been added 
to by the challenges of supranational integration within the EU. As Schierup, Hansen 
and Castles (2006: 3) have observed, the notion of a ‘social crisis and the breakdown 
of established identities and solidarities, focused on social rights of citizenship, have 
to varying degrees been exploited by nostalgic and reactionary populism that proposes 
“cultural difference” as the rationale for excluding all those who do not belong to “the 
nation”’. By proclaiming welfare crisis resulting from uncontrolled immigration in 
health services, education or housing, it becomes possible to reimagine the ‘people’ 
the welfare state consists of in relatively simple terms as those who share a degree of 
cultural similarity.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The prevalence a thin-centred ideology, with crude distinctions between ‘people’ and 
the ‘elite’ who are perceived in an antagonistic relationship, lends itself to particular 
strategies in relation to social policy. In short, these strategies have involved 
approaching the content and access of social citizenship through a simplified lens that 
interprets social rights as being conferred through a particular ethnic or cultural 
belonging. Moreover, the strategy crudely distinguishes between the different sets of 
interests of the ‘corrupt’ bureaucratic and political elite on the one hand and the ‘true’ 
people of ethnically and/or culturally homogeneous origin on the other hand. In other 
words, instead of aiming to grasp the true nature of deep and complex social 
problems, the narrow populist worldview deliberately simplifies them.  
 The tendency towards simplification, underpinned by a thin ideology, 
explanations that reference homogenous and antagonistic social groups, valorised 
‘people’ and a corrupt ‘elite’ has been an effective strategy in garnering support for 
welfare critique grounded in welfare chauvinism. The resultant myopic approach to 
wicked social policy problems around the nature of and access to social citizenship 
are a core part of the explanation for the successes of the European populist radical 
right in recent years. The relationship between social policy and the contemporary 
radical right ought to remain part of an active research agenda, as these policy-related 
discussions - even in their deliberate simplicity and essentialism - is what make the 
otherwise thin ideological content meaningful in local contexts.   
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